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Regulation and Land Withdrawals:
Defining "Valid Existing Rights"
INTRODUCTION
Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977 [hereinafter SMCRA or the Act], prohibits
surface coal mining operations2 on certain lands, subject to two
, Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1982)).
2 Surface coal mining operations is defined at SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. §
1291(28):
"surface coal mining operations" means:
(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface
coal mine or subject to the requirements of section 516 surface operations
and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, the products
of which enter commerce or the operations of which directly or indirectly
affect interstate commerce. Such activities include excavation for the pur-
pose of obtaining coal including such common methods as contour, strip,
auger, mountaintop removal, box cut, open pit, and area mining, the use
of explosives and blasting, and in situ distillation or retorting, leaching or
other chemical or physical processing, and the cleaning, concentrating, or
other processsing or preparation, loading of coal for interstate commerce
at or near the mine site: Provided, however, That such activities do not
include the extraction of coal incidental to the extraction of other minerals
where coal does not exceed 16 2/3 per centum of the tonnage of minerals
removed for purposes of commercial use or sale or coal exploration subject
to section 512 of this Act; and
(B) the areas upon which such activities occur or where such activities
disturb the natural land surface. Such areas shall also include any adjacent
land the use of which is incidental to any such activities, all lands affected
by the construction of new roads or the improvement or use of any existing
roads to gain access to the site of such activities and for haulage, and
excavations, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entry ways,
refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil banks, culm banks,
tailings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing areas,
shipping areas and other areas upon which are sited structures, facilities,
or other property or materials on the surface, resulting from or incident
to such activities.
Id.
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exceptions. 3 The first, a grandfather clause, excludes ongoing
mines existing on the date of enactment. The second exception
states that the prohibitions are "subject to valid existing rights."
4
While the first exception appears straightforward, the second
has generated much confusion and litigation. The second excep-
SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e):
After the enactment of this Act and subject to valid existing rights no
surface coal mining operations except those which exist on the date of
enactment of this Act shall be permitted -
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park
System, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems, the National System of
Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic
Rivers System, including study rivers designated under section 5(a) of the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and National Recreation Areas designated by
Act of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest:
Provided, however, That surface coal mining operations may be permitted
on such lands if the Secretary finds that there are no significiant recrea-
tional, timber, economic, or other values which may be incompatible with
such surface mining operations and -
(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground coal
mine; or
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with respect to lands
which do not have significant forest cover within those national forests
west of the 100th meridian, that surface mining is in compliance with the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, the National Forest Management Act of 1976,
and the provisions of this Act: And provided further, That no surface coal
mining operations may be permitted within the boundaries of the Custer
National Forest;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or place included
in the National Register of Historic Sites unless approved jointly by the
regulatory authority and the Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdiction
over the park or the historic site;
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public
road, except where mine access roads or haulage roads join such right-of-
way line and except that the regulatory authority may permit such roads
to be relocated or the area affected to lie within one hundred feet of such
road, if after public notice and opportunity for public hearing in the locality
a written finding is made that the interests of the public and the landowners
affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived
by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public building,
school, church, community, or institutional building, public park, or within
one hundred feet of a cemetery.
Id. (emphasis in original).
I Id. This term is not defined in the Act.
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tion's precise scope and meaning are still unsettled, and the
regulations defining the term have gone full circle since their
initial promulgation.
This Note examines the development of the term "valid
existing rights" [hereinafter "VER"] under the homestead acts,
early mining claims laws, leasing laws, and withdrawal statutes.
After discussing the litigation and repromulgation resulting from
the inclusion of "valid existing rights" in the Act, the Note
explores judicial and administrative determinations of VER as
the term was used in other statutes enacted both before and
contemporaneously with SMCRA. Finally, this Note investigates
the legislative history of Section 522(e) of the Act, and hopefully,
sheds some light on the meaning of "valid existing rights."
I. PROMULGATION AND LITIGATION
In 1979 the Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation En-
forcement [hereinafter OSM] published its first definition of
"valid existing rights." ' Those regulations provided that an area
otherwise designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining would
be deemed subject to VER if the applicant desiring to mine the
land could meet two requirements. The applicant had to dem-
onstrate that (1) he had acquired property rights, existing on
August 3, 1977, that would legally allow the production of coal
by surface mining; and (2) he either had acquired all necessary
state and federal permits to conduct surface mining, or he could
demonstrate that the coal was needed for and adjacent to a
surface mine for which all permits had been acquired by August
3, 1977.6 These regulations became known as (1) the ownership
test, (2) the all permits test, and (3) the needed for and adjacent
test. These regulatory tests were challenged by coal interests and
environmental groups, 7 as was the section of the Act giving rise
to the regulations.
44 Fed. Reg. 15,342 (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(l)-(2) (1979)).
6 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(1)-(2) (1979).
SMCRA § 526 (a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982) requires that any challenge
of national rules must be filed within 60 days from the date of the rule and must be
made by one with standing who also participated in the rule-making process. Since the
all permits test looked beyond state law, it can only be national in character.
19881
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The statutory unsuitability criteria was one of the issues
raised in the attack on the constitutionality of the Act. In Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,8 the United
States Supreme Court held the Act immune from facial attack.
In Hodel, Section 522(e) was challenged as an unconstitutional
taking of private property.9 Finding that the "mere enactment"
of SMCRA did not "[deny] an owner economically viable use
of his land. . ... 10 the Court held the takings challenge prema-
ture. In a footnote, the Court specifically pointed out that the
Section 522(e) prohibitions "are expressly made subject to 'valid
existing rights.' "I' Replying to the Mining Association's com-
plaint that the VER exception as defined by OSM was only
applicable via the all permits test, the Court stated "[tihis inter-
pretation of the exception is not compelled either by the statutory
language or its legislative history.' 12 Interestingly, the Secretary
had argued that the all permits test "was not a sine qua non
for valid existing rights."' 3 Instead, the all permits test was
deemed merely one method by which an applicant could dem-
onstrate VER. 14 The Secretary further acknowledged that "[t]he
limited legislative history of Section 522(e) makes it reasonably
clear that Congress used the phrase valid existing rights to in-
clude more than those surface mining operations that had ac-
tually received permits before the date of the statute."' 5
When Hodel came before the Supreme Court, OSM's initial
1979 regulations defining VER had already been remanded. In
In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 6 the Secre-
tary of the Interior retreated from his 1979 definition in two
ways. First, the Secretary conceded that "Congress intended the
term [VER] to encompass property rights recognized as valid
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
Id. at 294.
I0 d. at 296 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
,t Id. at n.37.
12 Id.
11 Reply Brief for the Acting Secretary of the Interior at 5, Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
14 Id.
1 Id. at 6.
11 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 1083 (D.D.C. 1980) (mem.) (Environmental
groups had also challenged the "needed for and adjacent" test, which was sustained.)
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VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
under state case law.' ' 7 Second, the court rejected the Secretar-
y's argument that an investment-backed expectations rationale
supported the all permits test. I" This argument, derived from
takings cases, was characterized by the court as "self-defeat-
ing." 19 The court noted that the investments and expectations
of an operator who has applied for and received all permits are
no different than the investments and expectations of an oper-
ator who has applied for but not yet received all permits.
20
Consequently, the regulation was remanded by the court for
revision.
In remanding the VER definition, however, the district court
did not reject the all permits test. Rather, the court instructed
OSM to modify its application of the test. The opinion suggested
that "a good faith attempt to obtain all permits before the
August 3, 1977 cut-off date should suffice for meeting the all
permits test." 2' Although this could be viewed as a judicial stamp
of approval for the all permits test, the fact that the court also
recognized the applicability of valid rights as determined under
state law militates against a wholehearted endorsement of the all
permits rationale. 22 If valid property rights conferred under state
law and in effect on the date of enactment of SMCRA were
intended by Congress to be a standard for VER, then the Secre-
tary's national level "all permits" test seems at odds with such
an intention.
23
Consistent with the district court's opinion, the Secretary
suspended the definition of VER insofar as it mandated acqui-
sition of all permits. Anticipating further rulemaking, the Sec-
retary proposed to interpret the VER all permits provision as
"requiring a good faith effort to obtain all permits." ' 24 Then, in
1982, OSM proposed three options for a new definition of
7 Id. at 1090.




I See Macleod & Means, When Is It Suitable to Be Unsuitable: An Analysis of
the Exemptions From the Surface Mining Act's Prohibition on Mining, 3 E. MiN. L.
FOUNDATION § 7.03[2].
23 Id.
45 Fed. Reg. 51,548 (1980).
19881
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VER. 25 The first and most restrictive of these was the "good
faith efforts" modification of the all permits test. 26 The second
option, described as "the opposite extreme," equated VER with
ownership. OSM noted that this option "would result in a
significant expansion in the number of areas having VER.
' '27
The third option, identified as a middle ground, was ownership
plus the right, as against the surface owner under state law, to
mine the coal by surface methods.
2
1
Under the 1979 definitions, the tests for ascertaining VER
were augmented by a proviso stating what VER was not.29 Orig-
inally, this paragraph stated that VER did not mean the "mere
expectation of a right to mine." The paragraph listed the fol-
lowing rights which were not VER: "coal exploration permits
or licenses, applications or bids for leases, or where a person
has only applied for a state or federal permit." 30 In proposing
new regulations in 1982, OSM likewise retailored this clarifying
paragraph to suit each option.3 Additionally, OSM proposed a
new paragraph stating that "VER may be found where no
reasonable use of the property other than surface mining would
otherwise remain."3 2 This addition reflected Congress' intent,
gleaned by OSM, that the VER provisions were inserted into the
Act "to protect property rights in order to insure that Section
522(e) of the Act would not lead to unconstitutional takings
without just compensation." 3
The Secretary's stated theory behind this provision was to
define VER so as to "provide a simple administrative means of
determining those rights which should be protected as VER to
avoid the constitutional issue." a4 OSM intended this additional
takings rationale as an expansion, or rather an exception, to
their proposed mechanical tests.35 In the event a landowner could
47 Fed. Reg. 25,279-81 (1982).
Id. The needed for and adjacent test was also slightly modified.
Id. at 25,280.
I d.
30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(1)-(2) (1979).
3I ld.
' See infra note 25.
47 Fed. Reg. 25, 281 (1982).
31 Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 14,992 (1979).
47 Fed. Reg. 25,281 (1982).
31 See id. at 25,282.
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not meet the mechanical tests, his remaining option would be to
obtain a judicial determination that the prohibition would con-
stitute a taking. Faced with such a judgment, OSM would con-
cede that the applicant had VER all along. 6 While this proposed
modification implied a recognition by OSM of its inability to
define the precise contours of VER, it also set the stage for
future litigation.
Upon finally announcing its new rule, OSM ignored all three
of its previously stated options. Instead, OSM defined VER in
terms of a taking:
"[A] person possesses valid existing rights for an area protected
under section 522(e) of The Act on August 3, 1977, if the
application of any of the prohibitions contained in that section
to the property interest that existed on that date would effect
a taking of the person's property which would entitle the
person to just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. ... ,37
This rule not only disposed of the all permits test, it abrogated
the core of the ownership test as well. Given the recent trend in
regulatory takings law, VER determinations based on takings
would tend to be rare.
38
The 1983 OSM definition of VER was challenged immedi-
ately.39 In In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig.
(I) 4 the district court once again remanded the Secretary's final
rule. This time the court did not reach the merits, but remanded
on procedural grounds. In the court's opinion, OSM's approach
to the new definition was "so different from the proposed
36 Id.
11 48 Fed. Reg. 41,349 (1983). (OSM still retained the needed for and adjacent
test.)
3. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971-
72); Note, Private Property and Environmental Regulatory Takings: A Forward Look
into Rights and Remedies as Illustrated by an Excursion into the Wild River Act of
Kentucky, 73 Ky. L.J. 999 (1984-85); See also McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon Revisited: Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of
the Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking? 16 TuLSA L.J. 418, 441 (1980-81). But
see Determination of Valid Existing Rights Within the Otter Creek Wilderness Area of
the Monongahela National Forest, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,228 (1984).
39 See supra note 7.
40 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (D.D.C. 1985).
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options that a new notice and comment period was necessary."' 4
While reserving its opinion on the merits, the court noted that
"only a court can decide whether a taking has occurred. Thus
• ..it is not clear whether the broad test or one of the mechan-
ical tests will better carry out congressional intent. '4 2 The court's
apparent concern was with the possibility that OSM or state
agencies would be involved in making takings determinations.
This uneasiness has been echoed by other commentators as well.
43
After the decision in In Re: (II), OSM suspended its 1983
"takings" test." According to the Secretary, this suspension had
the effect of erasing the 1983 rule, and reinstated the prior rule,
which was the 1979 "all permits" test, as modified by the 1980
"good faith effort" standard. Thus, ten years after the passage
of the Act, attempts at defining VER have taken a circular path,
and have resulted in confusion and uncertainty.
45
II. HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF VER
The confusion caused by the attempts to define VER is all
the more puzzling given the historic use of the term in mining
and property law. The concept of valid existing rights did not
originate with SMCRA; it has a long history of use in mining
law, mineral leasing law, and public lands statutes. However, in
the preamble to the initial 1979 SMCRA regulations, OSM re-
I Id. at 1559.
Id. at 1563 n.6.
41 See, e.g., McFerrin & Whitman, Valid Existing Rights and the Constitution:
1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 647 (1984); Short & Thomas, 2 Ky.
MiNERAL LAW 176 (1986); see also Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
" 51 Fed. Reg. 41,954 (1986).
4' See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. United States, 752 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Mineral owner alleged a taking of its coal reserves in the Custer National Forest. The
Court found the takings issue premature, and remanded for an administrative determi-
nation of VER.) If indeed "only a court can determine whether a taking has occurred,"
In re: Permanent (I), 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 1563 n.6, it seems
anomalous to reject making such a determination so that an administrative determination
on the matter can first be rendered. See also Ramex Mining Corp. v. Watt, 753 F.2d
521 (6th Cir. 1985). In Ramex, a mineral owner argued that the rights arising from its
reservation of the mineral estate underlying the Redbird Purchase Unit in Kentucky
precluded the operation of Section 522(e) because its interest was not "federal lands."
Id. at 523. The court disagreed and remanded the plaintiff's taking argument for an
administrative VER determination. Id. at 524.
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solved that past interpretations of VER were not applicable. The
Secretary's refusal to recognize other interpretations was prem-
ised on the notion that:
"ITihis Act [SMCRAI changed the context of VER signifi-
cantly because it makes clear that surface coal mining on any
private or federal land is not an absolute right, but is subject
to approval after a regulatory authority has determined that
reclamation to the standards of The Act can be achieved.""
This reasoning appears to be circular. OSM implies that no
property right can be exempt from Section 522(e) as a valid
existing right unless that right is such that it can meet the
standards of the Act itself. Hence OSM uses the strictures of
the Act to determine the validity of rights in existence prior to
the passage of the Act. 47 Such a requirement is rendered more
inexplicable in light of the narrow scope of Section 522(e)'s VER
exception. A VER determination does not guarantee an unfet-
tered right to mine; it merely takes the applicant out of the per
se prohibitions on mining.48 Full compliance with the standards
of the Act would still have to be observed by an operator.
49
Consequently, it is possible that even with VER, some other
provision of SMCRA would prevent surface mining on a partic-
ular property. Since the reasoning behind the Secretary's refusal
to recognize past usage of VER is questionable, a closer exam-
ination of such usages is in order.
The following discussion will demonstrate that courts, ad-
ministrative tribunals, and Congress have historically protected
as "valid rights" and "valid existing rights" certain expectations
conferred by statute in the acquisition of interests in public land
where the "rights" protected were something less than full own-
ership. It would seem anomalous to argue that rights incident
to full ownership should merit less protection.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 14,993 (1979).
41 MacLeod & Means, supra note 22, at § 7.03[5][c).
s See, e.g., Determination of Valid Existing Rights Within the Otter Creek Wil-
derness Area of the Monongahela National Forest, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,228 (1984).
49 Id.
19881
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A. Mining Claims
Early laws regarding mining on the public domain were based
on possession. 0 Entering, marking, and occupying public land
entitled the prospector to work the property and to maintain
ejectment proceedings against trespassers or junior claimants."
Additionally, constructive occupancy was recognized when the
prospector could demonstrate the following: (1) there were local
rules governing his action; (2) those rules required him to per-
form certain acts; and (3) he had fulfilled those requirements.
5 2
However, none of these acts vested ownership in the prospector;
the United States held the fee to public lands. At best, under
principles of equity, full compliance with the appropriate re-
quirements gave the mineral locator a beneficial interest, while
the United States retained the legal title "in trust.""
Although it had previously acknowledged the validity of local
laws governing mining claims,54 Congress incorporated and stan-
dardized the procedures to be followed in the Mining Act of
1872 [hereinafter Mining Act]." The fundamental requirements
of the Mining Act were discovery, notice, development work,
marking the ground, and filing a location certificate.5 6 Successful
completion of these requirements resulted in a valid claim
5 7
which could then be used to acquire a patent."'
In the process of acquiring legal title to an area claimed via
the Mining Act, three sets of rights come into play. Prior to the
discovery of a valuable mineral on a location, the rights of the
prospector are governed by the doctrine of pedis possessio.5 9
These rights are similar to the early common law rights based
See generally 2 LINDLEY ON MINES § 536 (1914).
" Id. at § 537.
I d.
" Noyes v. Matle, 127 U.S. 348, 351 (1888); See also 2 LINDLEY ON MINES § 539.
', Lode Law of 1886, 14 Stat. 251; Placer Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 217.
Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C. §§ 22-47. See generally 1 AM. L. OF MINING, § 4.11 (2d ed. 1986).
" 2 AM. L. OF MINING § 33.02[l] (2d ed. 1986).
17 Id. These same requirements are still basically in effect today.
11 See 30 U.S.C. § 29; 2 AM. L. OF MINING § 51.02 (2d ed. 1986).
19 Union Oil v. Smith, 294 U.S. 337 (1919); Ranchers Exploration v. Anaconda,
248 F. Supp. 708 (1965 D. Utah, Central Division); See generally 2 AM. L. OF MINING,
§ 34.01-34.06 (2d ed. 1986).
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on possession. As long as the prospector is occupying and dili-
gently searching for the mineral, he cannot be ousted by fraud-
ulent or forcible means of a third party. 60 As with the common
law of possession, the prospector's right to occupy is good as
against all except the true owner, the United States. 61 Thus, he
can utilize the courts to protect his claims against competing
mineral prospectors .62
Before a discovery is made, the prospector's claim is consid-
ered invalid. 63 Upon discovery of a valuable mineral deposit,
64
however, the locator succeeds to a valid unpatented mining claim
which vests in him an exclusive right of possession and enjoy-
ment. 65 Such a claim is valid as against the United States, 66 and
is considered "property in the fullest sense of the word."
67
Moreover, although title still remains with the United States, a
valid mining claim has the effect of a grant, 6s and carries with
it an inchoate right to a patent,69 although there is no require-
ment that the locator proceed to patent.
Still, the rights of the locator of a valid mining claim are
only possessory in nature, and he acquires no title until he
applies for and receives a patent. 70 Without a patent, the loca-
tor's rights are subject to divestiture and regulation. As long as
the United States retains legal title, the Secretary can make
determinations of the validity of a particular claim. 7' If the
Secretary determines that the claim does not conform to the
requirements of the statute, the claim is considered invalid and
thus no rights attach against the United States. For example, if
66 Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1919).
61 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
62 Union Oil, 294 U.S. 337; Rancher's Exploration, 248 F. Supp. 708.
63 Cole, supra note 60.
" For a discussion of the requirements for discovery, see Toffenetti, Valid Mining
Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 31 (1985).
65 30 U.S.C. § 26 codification R.S. § 2322 derived from act May 10, 1872 ch. 152
§ 3.17 Stat. 91.
" Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1962).
67 Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 767 (1876); see also Cole, 252 U.S. at 295.
Forbes, 94 U.S. at 767.
69 2 AM. L. OF MINING, § 36.03[3] (2d ed. 1986).
71 Id. at § 36.03[2]. (When the patent is applied for, equitable title is deemed to
pass to the applicant.)
71 Cameron, 252 U.S. at 460.
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the mineral has played out so that production is no longer
ongoing, and diligent development has ceased, the rights of the
locator may be rescinded by the Secretary.1 2 Similarly, if the
locator uses the claim for some kind of non-mining activity, the
Secretary may likewise declare the claim invalid.
73
The rights which attach to a valid mining claim are not
necessarily rights in futuro. Because the Mining Act requires
discovery of a valuable mineral deposit, it can only be said that
a claim currently exists at a given time. While the same can be
said for the lesser pedis possessio rights, the difference between
the prospector's rights in working toward discovery and the
locator's rights after making discovery is that the latter set of
rights are deemed to have vested in the valid claim.
As noted above, such rights are good even against the gov-
ernment, the actual owner of the land. 74 This unique form of a
"vested" right is something of an anomaly in property law.75
The "vested" right is short of equitable title, but carries rights
similar to those that are conferred by equitable title. The tradi-
tional judicial interpretation has been that the government acts
as a trustee holding full title for the benefit of the locator.
76
This suggests a fiduciary relationship, and implies principles of
estoppel. Since the acquisition of statutory rights of possession
and enjoyment are conditioned on the performance of certain
acts, the courts held that one who has in good faith complied
with the statute by "doing all he could do" should not be
deprived of those rights. 77 Thus, although these rights of pos-
session and enjoyment have been accorded the status of property
and have been held protected as such under the fifth amend-
ment, 8 they are a lesser estate than the full ownership status
7 See, e.g., United States v. Logomarcini, 60 I.D. 371 (1949).
11 See United States v. Houston, 66 I.D. 161 (1959).
14 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
11 See Best, 371 U.S. at 335 (The Court described it as a "unique form of
property."); Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 909 n.4; see also infra note 184.
16 Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U.S. 348 (1888); Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455. See generally
2 LINDLEY ON MrNES, § 539 (1914).
77 The Yosemite Valley Case, 82 U.S. 77 (1872).
"' See, e.g., Best, 252 U.S. 334; Opinion of the Attorney General, 25 I.D. 48
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of a severed mineral interest. 9 However, since it carries neither
equitable nor legal title, a valid claim cannot be referred to as
an estate in land. Rather, a valid mining claim should be seen
as a valid claim to mining rights. It is in this capacity that valid
mining claims have been accorded the status of "valid existing
rights." 0
B. Mineral Leases
Coal, however, was never subject to the Mining Act. On the
public domain, coal rights were originally disposed of through
pre-emption and entry under the general settlement laws.8" Then,
from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century,
numerous acts were passed that specifically dealt with the out-
right sale of coal-bearing lands by the government.8 2 Of para-
mount importance were the Coal Lands Acts of 190983 and
1910 .8 These acts reserved from all prospective mineral and non-
mineral patents the rights to the coal underlying public lands.
Thus the United States retained title to coal in the public domain,
despite granting or allowing entry onto such land for other
purposes .5
In 1920, Congress passed the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
[hereinafter Leasing Act] which set up a comprehensive scheme
for the exploitation of non-metallic minerals, including coal.
8 6
(1897) (This opinion was actually written by the Assistant Attorney General, Van
Deuanter, who later served on the United States Supreme Court.)
SC.f. Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 49 F. 549, 551 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892) (de-
scribing how a claim merges into full title when a patent is granted, and describing how
this effects the dower interests).
10 See also Toffenetti, supra note 64; Solicitor's Op., 53 I.D. 491 (1931); Solicitor's
Op., 88 I.D. 909, 911 (1981); Solicitor's Op., 86 I.D. 91 (1979). But see Stockley v.
United States, 260 U.S. 532 (1928).
11 General Pre-Emption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453; Homestead Act of 1862,
ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
12 Act of July 1, 1864, ch. 205, 13 Stat. 343; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 107, 13
Stat. 549; Coal Lands Act of 1873, ch. 279, 17 Stat. 607, (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 71-76 (1982). See generally 1 AM L. OF MINING, §§ 2201-22.03 (2d ed. 1986).
'1 Coal Lands Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844, 30 (codified as amended
at 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1982)).
" Coal Lands Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318, 36 Stat. 583 (codified as amended
at 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1982)).
85 See supra notes 83 and 84.
" Act of February 20, 1925, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1982).
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Under the Leasing Act, the United States retained full ownership
of coal in the ground. Acquisition of coal deposits was made
available through leasing arrangements. The Leasing Act pro-
vided for two types of leases: competitive leases and non-com-
petitive leases.87 For competitive leases, the statute provided that
the Secretary could "in his discretion, . . . from time to time,
offer such lands for leasing and shall award leases thereon by
competitive bidding." 8 This section applied to lands upon which
there were known coal deposits. Where the existence of coal
deposits was not known, however, the non-competitive leasing
system applied. Under this system, the statute stated that the
Secretary could at his discretion issue prospecting permits to
qualified applicants.8 9 Once "commercial quantities" of the min-
eral were found, however, the applicant was "entitled to a
lease." 9 The non-competitive leases are commonly referred to
as preference right leases. 91
The mere application for a lease under the Leasing Act could
vest no right in the applicant. In United States ex. rel McLennan
v. Wilbur,92 the Supreme Court construed the Leasing Act and
noted the "difference between applicants for mere privileges and
those persons who because of expenditures, or otherwise, de-
served special consideration." 93 From the language of the statute
the Court inferred that "Congress held in mind the distinction
between a positive mandate to the Secretary and permission to
take certain actions in his discretion."
'94
Since Wilbur, the ability of an applicant under the Leasing
Act to compel action on the part of the Secretary, i.e., to assert
the right to a lease, has been determined on the basis of this
mandatory/discretionary distinction.95 While founded on the ra-
tionale, expressed in Wilbur, of special consideration because of
17 See generally I AM. L. OF MINING § 23.02 (2d ed. 1986).
u 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970), amended by 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (1976).
9 Id.
9o See I AM. L. OF MiING § 23.04 (2d ed. 1986).
Id.
283 U.S. 414 (1931).
91 Id. at 418.
% Id.
91 C.f Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 912 n.5 (1981).
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"expenditures, or otherwise,'"'9 courts recently have looked solely
to the duty imposed on the Secretary throughout the statute as
the sine qua non for lease rights. This is especially true in the
case of preference right leases. Once a prospecting permit was
issued, the applicant had two years, with possible extensions, to
locate "commercial quantities" of coal. 97 As with the discovery
requirement of the Mining Act, 98 upon fulfillment of this con-
dition certain rights vested in the permittee. 99 Consequently, the
Secretary had no choice but to issue the lease upon timely
application. m00
Like valid mining claims, rights to a lease fall somewhere
between ownership and non-ownership. Even when a lease is
granted, the United States retains title to the severed property
interest. 101 The miner merely acquires the right to enter the land
and remove the coal therein. However, this right is considered
an interest in property. 0 2 Since this property right can vest prior
to the issuance of the lease, though, it must be something less
than a leasehold. Still, the right concerns land and is something
more than a mere expectation or contingency. 13 Thus, the Leas-
ing Act confers rights in the nature of a property interest, which,
while not transferring title, create a certain possessory relation-
ship between the permittee and the property.
C. Withdrawals and Savings Clauses
As the foregoing implies, the United States holds title to vast
areas of land, especially in the Western United States. °4 How-
Wilbur, 283 U.S. at 418.
- See 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
" See text accompanying supra notes 64-69.
" See, e.g., N.R.D.C. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 557 n.16 (D.D.C. 1978).
® See supra note 97.
101 See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1965). These "statutes relate to leasing
rather than alienation of title ... " Id. at 20.
101 Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 911 (1981).
103 Id.
10, As a general rule, the United States owns mineral resources on the public
domain; however, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Berklund, 609 F.2d 553. Also, the
United States has come to own large amounts of land in the Eastern United States. Coal
rights acquired by the government in these lands are leased under the Mineral Leasing
Act for Acquired Lands, ch. 573, 61 Stat. 913 (1947), (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
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ever, beginning with the conservation movement in the early
20th century and continuing more recently with the increasing
public awareness of environmental concerns, parts of the public
domain have been withdrawn from exploitation by the private
sector. 05 These withdrawals prevented prospective exploration
and cut off invalid claims. °6 Although withdrawals have been
numerous and have taken many forms, they invariably have
contained language designed to protect existing rights acquired
prior to the time of withdrawal. 0 7 The specific language used
has varied, but the usual phrase preserves valid existing claims
or valid existing rights. Indeed, the term "valid existing rights"
is used in over one hundred places in scattered statutes. 0 This
extensive use by Congress of the term "VER" indicates (1) that
the term has a definite meaning, and (2) that Congress is aware
of its meaning.
Both courts of law and administrative tribunals have defined
VER as used in withdrawal statutes through decisions in home-
stead cases. In Williams v. Brening, °9 the Interior Department
applied the savings clause of an Executive Order withdrawing
from homestead entry islands in the coastal waters off the state
of Florida. Noting that the withdrawal was not absolute, the
Department construed the clause saving " 'any valid existing
rights' in and to the lands so withdrawn"" 0 to include a pre-
ferred right which had been earned but not yet awarded. Given
this savings language, the Secretary held "Itihe withdrawal was
designed to prevent the initiation of new claims and not the
destruction of rights theretofore fairly earned.""'
§§ 351-59 (1982)). However, the Leasing Act of 1920 provides the procedural mechanism
through which these acquired lands are leased. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Hodel,
630 F. Supp 621 (D.D.C. 1986).
,o See generally 1 Am. L. OF MInING, § 14 (2d ed. 1986).
106 C.f. Lutzenhiser v. Udall, 432 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1970).
1o See I AM. L. OF MINING § 14 (2d ed. 1986) (Statutes, Executive Orders, and
Public Land Orders have all been utilized to effect withdrawals).
Im Mostly in Title 16 (Conservation), but also Title 25 (Indians), Title 43 (Public
Lands), Title 45 (Railroads), Title 48 (Territories), Title 42 (Health and Welfare), and,
of course, Title 30 (Mineral Lands and Mining).





In Challenge to Validity of Mining Claims in National
Parks,"2 a Solicitor's opinion considered the applicability of
savings clauses in Acts of Congress establishing National Parks
to abandoned mineral locations." 3 Interestingly, the Solicitor
distinguished the question of "validity" from the question of
"existing." As noted above, the department can adjudicate the
issue of the validity of claims at any time prior to the issuance
of a patent." 4 However, the Solicitor determined that "aban-
donment does not present the question of validity or invalidity
of a location . . ., but implies that it was valid. . . ."I" Thus,
the opinion concluded by recommending that the issue be recon-
sidered to determine whether discoverable minerals were known
to be existing at the time of withdrawal." 6 The obvious conclu-
sion would be that if discoverable minerals were known to exist
at that time, the claim would be within the savings clause.
The Solicitor again took up the question of VER in reference
to a 1934 executive order which temporarily withdrew lands in
twelve western states from settlement, location, or entry." 7 This
withdrawal was specifically made "subject to existing valid
rights.""' 8 One of the questions submitted to the Solicitor by the
Secretary was the meaning of the phrase "subject to existing
valid rights.""' 9 While noting that "the circumstances of each
particular case will have to be considered,' ' 20 the Solicitor relied
"2 Solicitor's Op., 53 I.D. 491 (1931).
.3 The particular clause considered stated:
nothing herein shall affect any valid existing claim, location, or entry
or shall affect the rights of any such claimant, locator, or entryman to the
full use and enjoyment of his land.
Id. at 493.
This particular language was utilized in creating the Grand Canyon National Park Act
of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 44, 40 Stat. 1175 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 225 (1982)).
The Solicitor deemed this opinion to apply to "similar declarations" in Acts establishing
other National Parks.
'4 See text accompanying supra notes 70-73; see also Cameron v. United States,
252 U.S. 459 (1920).
"I Solicitor's Op., 53 I.D. at 495.
116 Id. at 497, 498.
1t7 Solicitor's Op., 55 I.D. 205 (1935). (The withdrawal was mandated by Executive
Order of Nov. 26, 1934, No. 6910.)
"I Id. at 207.
39 Id.
1 Id. at 210.
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on Williams for the proposition that "the withdrawal was in-
tended to exclude the initiation of new claims, not to destroy
claims theretofore fairly earned." '' 2' The Solicitor stated as a
matter of course that "all valid entries are protected." He fur-
ther opined that the savings clause should be applied "gener-
ously," so that "valid applications," "substantially complete at
the time of the withdrawal" would be considered "valid existing
rights," as would claims for which "bona fide and substantial
rights" existed at the time of withdrawal.'
22
This opinion was applied in the case of George J. Propp.
2
1
In late 1933, Propp simultaneously applied for a homestead
entry' 24 and for designation of the lands he had entered as "stock
raising." Prior to the designation of those lands as suitable for
stock raising, however, the lands were withdrawn from settle-
ment.'2 Propp argued that his application for entry gave him
valid existing rights so as to come under the savings language
of the withdrawal order. Relying on the above mentioned opin-
ion, the Secretary determined that Propp did not have VER.
The Secretary first noted that designation of public lands was
discretionary. Because no designation opinion had been made
prior to the withdrawal, no rights had been acquired, since
undesignated lands were not subject to entry. 126 Second, the
Secretary rejected Propp's reliance on the Solicitor's language,
"valid applications ... which were substantially complete at the
date of withdrawal should be considered as constituting valid
existing rights.' '127 Since the land was never designated as subject
to entry, the application was incomplete, and hence did not give
rise to any rights as against the government.
28
In Louis J. Hobbs,2 9 the Secretary reiterated the rule from
Williams that a clause saving valid existing rights is "designed
121 Id. (quoting Williams, 51 I.D. 225).
122 Id.
M" 56 I.D. 347 (1938).
11 Propp applied for entry under the Stock Raising Homestead Act of Dec. 29,
1916. (Repealed by the Taylor Grazing Act of June 28, 1934).
125 Propp, 56 I.D. at 351.
126 Id.
27 Solicitor's Op., 55 I.D. at 210.
Propp, 56 I.D. at 353.
77 I.D. 5 (1970).
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to prevent the initiation of new claims and not the destruction
of rights theretofore fairly earned."' 30 Hobbs held a preference
right to a homestead entry of certain lands in Alaska, to which
he became entitled by virtue of successfully contesting a prior
entry. '3 However, upon filing for actual entry, his application
was dismissed because the local land office records did not reflect
the cancellation of the prior entry. Meanwhile, subject to a
Public Land Order,'3 2 all unreserved public lands in Alaska were
withdrawn from further disposition and all pending applications
were suspended. "' However, the withdrawal was made "subject
to valid existing rights."'134 Thus the issue was whether Hobbs
had VER on the date of withdrawal.'35 Finding this case on all
fours with Williams, the Secretary held that Hobbs had VER.
The judiciary also had occasion to define and apply VER
consistently with the term's historical use. In Ickes v. Virginia-
Colorado Dev. Corp. ,36 the United States Supreme Court con-
strued the savings clause of the Mineral Leasing Act. The Leas-
ing Act, as discussed above, changed the prior method of
exploiting mineral resources on the public domain. One of the
requirements was the performance of annual assessment work.
3 7
Section 37 of the Leasing Act, however, excepted "valid claims
existent at date of the passage of this Act." Finding that under
pre-Leasing Act law the lack of assessment work would not void
a claim, the Court held that no right had been lost by failure to
do the assessment work. 3 The Court stated that "the saving
provision of section 37 of the Leasing Act is a part of the policy
of the Act. Its terms explicitly declare the will of Congress as
o valid existing claims, with full understanding of the status of
such claims under the prior law."
More recently, courts have interpreted VER in the context
of the savings clause of the Coal Leasing Amendments Act of
I30 d. at 7-8 (quoting Williams, 51 I.D. 225).
3 Id. This entry was under the Homestead Act of 1880, and the contest right
appears at 43 U.S.C. § 185.
34 Fed. Reg. 1,025 (1969).
"3 The lands were reserved to protect the rights of Native Alaskan Indians.
114 Hobbs, 77 I.D. at 6.
Id. at 7.
' 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
Id. at 642-43.
I' d. at 646.
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1975 [hereinafter Leasing Amendments]. 39 As noted above, the
Leasing Act established two means of acquiring the right to
exploit coal resources on federal land: competitive bidding and
preference rights.140 The Leasing Amendments abolished the
preference right system, subject to VER.' 4' The scope of that
VER exception was subsequently litigated in a number of cases.
In American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 42 the court held that
an application for a prospecting permit tendered prior to the
enactment of the Leasing Amendments was not VER. American
Nuclear had argued that under Stockley v. United States,'4 a
valid existing claim could be something less than a vested right.
Stockley concerned a claim of entry under the Homestead Act
of 1891.' 4 The claimant had filed his entry but had not yet
received a certificate therefor when the oil rights (which he had
already leased out) were withdrawn by executive order in 1908.
The Stockley Court held that, under the Homestead Act, receipt
of payment was all that was required for the applicant's rights
to be complete.14 By way of dicta, the Stockley Court suggested
that the savings language of the withdrawal order should be read
broadly enough to include the application for entry as consti-
tuting a "valid existing claim."' The American Nuclear court
distinguished Stockley, however, on the grounds of the manda-
tory/discretionary distinction.147 The court noted that in Stock-
ley, the Land Department had no discretion in issuing a patent
upon compliance with the Homestead Act. Under the Leasing
Act, however, the Secretary had discretion in deciding whether
to accept or reject a prospecting permit. 48 Because the Secretary
had no duty to issue a permit upon application, no valid existing
right to such a permit existed.
139 30 U.S.C. § 201(b).
' See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
141 Pub. L. 94-377, Section 4. See notes following 30 U.S.C. § 201.
,42 434 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Wyo. 1977).
.,3 260 U.S. 532 (1923).
Homestead Act of 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1097.
,, Stockley, 260 U.S. at 541 (on the theory that the applicant had done all he
could do to acquire the right to a patent).
I" Id. at 541-42, 544.
1' For a discussion of the mandatory/discretionary distinction, see supra notes 92-
97 and accompanying text.
" American Nuclear, 434 F. Supp. at 1037.
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However, if a prospecting permit was outstanding at the time
of the enactment of the Leasing Amendments, the permittee has
been deemed to have VER in a lease. In N.R.D.C. v. Berk-
lund, 49 the District Court for the District of Columbia construed
the language of Section 201(b) of the Leasing Act, and deter-
mined that the language "shall be entitled," "does not permit
the Secretary to reject preference right leases on purely environ-
mental grounds.""150 The court found the duty to issue such leases
upon a showing of commercial quantities to be non-discretion-
ary. Hence, under the analysis employed in American Nuclear,
VER would attach to outstanding permits if the requisite show-
ing could be made."'
The VER savings clause of the Leasing Amendments was
considered again in Peterson v. Department of Interior.112 The
plaintiffs in Peterson had been granted prospecting permits but
were requesting extensions, not leases. Under the Leasing Act,
extension of permits was discretionary, although such extensions
were generally granted."' After the enactment of the Leasing
Amendments abolished the preference right system, the Secretary
argued that he no longer had authority to grant extensions." 54
The court noted that the Secretary technically had discretion,
but opined that the extension applications gave rise to VER
where "[the applicants] had met statutory and regulatory re-
quirements and had expended time and money to develop their
prospecting permits.""' The court felt it unfair to foreclose from
the applicants any possibility of a return on their investment.
However, the court narrowed the scope of the applicants' rights
to consideration of the Secretary which they would have received
prior to the Leasing Amendments.156
141 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Berklund, 458 F. Supp. at 935.
But cf. Utah Int'l v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962 (D. Utah 1979) (holding that
the Secretary does have discretion in determining the terms of a preference right lease).
1 510 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1981).
"I "Any coal prospecting permit . . . may be extended by the secretary .... 30
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1971).
Peterson, 510 F. Supp. at 780; see also Island Creek Co., 85 I.D. 161 (1978).
Peterson, 510 F. Supp. at 783.
516 Id. at 784.
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D. Implications of the Historic Use of VER
While not an exhaustive account of the history of VER, the
foregoing does provide some insight on the use and development
of the term. First, as an interest in land, VER is a property
right.' 7 Although short of a fee estate, VER marks a point at
which certain rights in relation to the particular piece of property
vest in the individual.5 8 Consequently, out of that bundle of
rights that make up ownership, certain aspects of dominion and
control must be recognized as being outside the unfettered dis-
cretion of the true owner. Since in public land law the United
States owns the land in fee, VER has been developed in terms
of the attachment of rights as against the government.
When viewed as restrictions on the dominion and control of
the United States as owner, these rights appear premised on two
basic ideas: protecting the owner by avoiding takings;'59 and
protecting the holder of VER under general principles of equity
and fairness. 6 The avoidance of unconstitutional takings, of
course, would represent the rationale for the most narrow read-
ing of VER exemptions. But while this has been a concern of
Congress, it would not alone account for the approach embodied
in a number of cases which speak of bona fide and substantial
rights,' 6' fairness, 62 reliance, 63 and rights deserving special con-
sideration. '64
That Congress understood the meaning of VER is evidenced
in its use of the term in three statutes enacted in the mid-1970s:
the Coal Leasing Amendments, the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act [hereinafter FLPMA or Policy Act], 65 and
" Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 767 (1876); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 294-95
(1919).
,"1 2 AM. L. OF MINING § 36.01 (2d ed. 1986); See also N.R.D.C. v. Berklund, 609
F.2d 553 (D.D.C. 1978).
" See, e.g., Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
11 See, e.g., United States ex. rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 424 (1931);
Williams v. Brening, 51 I.D. 225 (1925).
,6, See Williams, 51 I.D. 225.
,62 See Peterson v. Department of Interior, 510 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1981);
Peabody Coal v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 120 (D. Wyo. 1979); See also McGinley &
Barrett, supra note 38.
'6 See Aleknagik Natives v. United States, 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414.
t' 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-57 (1983).
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SMCRA. The Leasing Amendments, as noted above, abolished
the preference right leasing system of the Leasing Act of 1920,
subject to VER. In explaining what was meant by VER, the
Senate Committee Report stated that "[tihe committee intends
to maintain the status quo with respect to any such rights, and
not to enlarge or diminish them in any way."'' The concern
expressed by the Committee - to maintain the status quo - is
not necessarily synonymous with "takings" law. Rather, it ap-
pears to be a reflection of the idea expressed in Williams v.
Brening, 67 that "the withdrawal was designed to prevent the
initiation of new claims, and not the destruction of rights there-
tofore fairly earned."168
This same idea of preserving the status quo has also been
evidenced in Interior Department VER cases. In George J.
Propp, 69 Propp moved onto lands and simultaneously applied
for a homestead entry and designation of the lands as suitable
for stock raising. While entry alone would have been enough
for VER to attach under the Homestead Act, 70 Propp also
placed reliance in a change in the status quo: that the land would
be redesignated. Such designation, however, was discretionary
on the part of the Secretary. Propp's VER never attached be-
cause the desired change in the status quo never came about.
Had the land already been designated, VER would have attached
under the Homestead Act and the status quo would have been
preserved. As it was, however, preserving the status quo was
precisely what made his VER claim fail.
17'
When the federal lands program was revamped through the
FLPMA in 1977,172 the power of management conferred upon
the Secretary was modified by the provision that "all actions of
S. REP. No. 296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975).
51 I.D. 225 (1925).
I' d. at 226.
56 I.D. 347 (1938). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes
117-22.
110 Cf. Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532 (1923).
" But see Theodore J. Almasy, 87 I.D. 81 (1980) (holding that any valid existing
right protected under Section 14(g) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 85 Stat.
688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1976)), must have been "derived
from and created by the state or federal government.") Accord Valid Existing Rights
Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 85 I.D. 1 (1977).
" See generally I AM. L. oF MINING § 14.02 (2d ed. 1986).
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the Secretary concerned under this act shall be subject to valid
existing rights. 1 7 This phrase was construed in two opinions of
the Solicitor as it relates to Section 603 of the Policy Act, which
governs the wilderness review and non-impairment duties of the
Secretary. 17 4 In the first of these opinions,1" the Solicitor em-
phasized that, in reference to mining leases, the "right" may be
regulated even though it may not be "taken."' ' 76 Consequently,
the Solicitor found that maintaining the non-impairment stan-
dard through regulating the exercise of valid rights could proceed
consistently with the mandate of Section 701's VER exemp-
tion.
177
Operating under this theory, the Secretary continued to grant
leases, but refused to allow development under those leases. The
oil and gas industry challenged this action in Rocky Mountain
Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Andrus.17 There, the court found that:
the Solicitor's opinion and the prevailing philosophy which
ensued fly directly in the face of [Section] 701 of FLPMA
which states that no existing right is to be destroyed. Through
implementation of the Solicitor's opinion, the BLM [Bureau
of Land Management] has, by its actions, entirely negated this
statutory provision. 
79
Although the court noted that leases are subject to the Secre-
tary's regulations, it held that "regulations that regulate to the
extent of destruction" are invalid. 80
" 43 U.S.C. § 1701(h) (1976) (FLPMA § 701(h)).
" 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976) (FLPMA Section 603). The wilderness review program
is basically the means by which the Secretary determines which federal lands should be
included in the National Wilderness Preservation System. During the fifteen-year review
process, the Secretary is instructed to "manage the lands so as not to impair the
suitability of such areas."
'" Solicitor's Op., 86 I.D. 89 (1979).
Id. at 117.
11 Id. at 118.
"1 500 F. Supp 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982). The
court of appeals did not reach the issue of VER in reversing the district court decision.
Rather, the court rested its decision on the language of Section 603's grandfathering
clause. Thus, for the time being at least, the scope of Section 701(h)'s application to
the non-impairment standard rests in the Solicitor's modified opinion. See infra note
181.




As a result of this decision, the Solicitor modified his earlier
opinion in a second opinion that adopted the Department's
position on appeal in the Rocky Mountain case.' 8' This opinion
specifically dealt with VER and wilderness review. In explaining
the Secretary's approach, the Solicitor described VER as "those
rights short of vested rights that are immune from denial or
extinguishment by the exercise of secretarial discretion."1 2 Elab-
orating on this definition, the Solicitor distinguished two meth-
ods by which VER is created: operation of statute and final
discretionary action. As an example of the former, he posed
valid mining claims; as an example of the latter he posited
approval of a lease application. As to the scope of VER rights
that attach, each must be considered individually in light of "the
developmental rights actually conveyed" by statute or lease and
the "site-specific conditions confronting the rights holder."" 3
Both the definition and the distinction between types of VER
appear misplaced. First, valid existing rights are a form of vested
rights. Both valid mining claims and preference lease rights have
been deemed to vest in the claimant. 184 Moreover, these rights
vest at a time prior to the conveyance of equitable title.8 5 While
the Secretary's discretion with regard to both is circumscribed,
he still may contest the validity of a mining claim at any time
prior to patent, and may extend or not extend leases. Hence,
while the Solicitor noted that the right preserved in a preference
right lease is merely the right to an adjudication,8 6 the same
holds true for any mining claim short of patent.
"' Solicitor's Op., 88 1.D. 909, 910 n.l (1981).
82 Id. at 912.
Is d. at 912-13.
"' See Best v. Humboldt Mining Co. 371 U.S. 334 (1962); N.R.D.C. v. Berklund,
609 F.2d 553 (D.D.C. 1978). The word "vest" as used by the courts and as developed
under common law differs from the peculiarly narrow interpretation given the term by
the Bureau of Land Management. See Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 912 n.4. The bureau
equates "vested rights" with land patents. In common law, though, "vest" is a much
broader concept. It means "to give an immediate, fixed right of present or future
enjoyment.... To accrue to: to be fixed; to take effect." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY,
(5th ed. 1979). The term is used in this Note in its common law sense.
"1 2 AM. L. OF MINING § 36.03[21 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, they "vest" in the common
law sense, not the BLM sense of being patented. Id.
I" Supra note 177, at n. 5. Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 912 (1981).
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However, the Solicitor distinguished pre-FLPMA leases from
post-FLPMA leases in terms of the scope of VER in relation to
the non-impairment standard. Consistent with the Williams hold-
ing that VER prevents new claims but preserves existing ones,
the Solicitor held that only pre-FLPMA VERs could be devel-
oped to the full extent authorized at the time those rights at-
tached. As to post-FLPMA leases, the non-impairment standard
was deemed to give the Secretary an additional regulatory check
on development activities. 8 7 Thus, the Solicitor conducted a two-
step analysis: first, the determination of whether VER attached,
then, a determination of the scope of those rights. However,
once that determination was reached, the inquiry focused on
how far those rights could be regulated. As in his prior opin-
ion,'88 the Solicitor maintained that the existence of VER was a
separate question from regulating the rights that had attached.
The latter opinion modified the prior one, though, conceding
that there were limits to the extent of permissible regulation.
According to the Solicitor, after the enactment of the FLPMA,
the Secretary's authority to issue leases was contingent on the
non-impairment standard. 8 9 Pre-FLPMA leases, however, fell
under the non-impairment standard only if they exceeded the
extent of permissible development deemed "unnecessary" or
9unwarranted." 10
This threshold analysis - determining the existence of VER
as a separate question from whether those rights are to be
regulated - was echoed in Sierra Club v. Watt.191 There the
issue was whether the VER exemption of Section 701(h) pre-
cluded the Secretary from including split-estate lands in the
wilderness review system. The Interior Board of Land Appeals
had held that VER in the mineral estate automatically excluded
federal-owned surface lands from the study system. 192 On appeal,
the court noted "mining activities are by no means precluded
by wilderness designation .... They are, however, subject to
"I Id. at 913.
818 Solicitor's Op., 86 I.D. 89, 117 (1979).
119 Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 913 (1981).
190 Id.
191 608 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
"9 Santa Fe Pacific RR Co. 64 I.B.L.A. 27 (1982).
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strict controls." 193 Interestingly, the court distinguished between
final designation of a wilderness area and inclusion of an area
within the wilderness study system. Analogizing to the California
Wilderness Act, 19 4 the court found that since Congress made the
administration of designated areas subject to VER, they must
not have meant for VER to preclude study of those areas. 95
Finally, commenting on the nature of vested rights in mineral
estates, the court stated that "placement of those areas into
wilderness review and even eventually into wilderness designation
does not deny or extinguish the owner's property right in the
subsurface estate. The land may still be mined subject to certain
controls . . .or Congress may choose to recompense the owner
through exchange or payment."'96
Thus the court, concerned with protecting rights as well as
allowing the study process to continue, struck a balance that
would observe the status quo to the extent reasonably possible.
Non-grandfathered mining was not precluded, but was made
subject to the non-impairment standard. Since the study period
could be merely a "brief hiatus from potential development,"
no right was extinguished. 97 Again, the distinction between rec-
ognizing the existence of the right and the extent of the Secre-
tary's ability to regulate the right was implicit in this decision.
III. VER UNDER SMCRA
When the Secretary promulgated regulations pursuant to Sec-
tion 522(e) of SMCRA, he blurred this distinction between the
existence of the right and the extent of regulation. Instead, he
emphasized the "changed context of VER" which he attributed
to the lack of any absolute right to surface mine. 9 This lack of
any absolute right to mine was premised on the performance
regulations and reclamation standards that the Act itself re-
"9 Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 334.
1 Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984) (designating parts of California as
Wilderness Areas).
" Sierra Club, 608 F.Supp. at 334.
" Id. at 335.
19 Id. (quoting Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 750 (10th
Cir. 1982)).
I" See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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quired.'99 This is backwards reasoning. Rather than first looking
to the right and then determining the extent of the right and the
effect of regulation thereon, he focused first on the extent of
regulation and used that to determine the existence of the right;
yet the key to VER, as demonstrated by its historic use, is that
these rights were already existing at the time the regulations were
enacted. 20 0 Hence it begs the question to use the regulations
promulgated under the Act to determine the existence of VER.
Congress was aware of the meaning of VER at the time the
Act was passed. As mentioned above, not only was the term
used in three separate Acts of Congress passed in the mid-
1970s, 20 1 it is also currently found in over 100 statutes. 2 2 This
extensive Congressional recognition strongly indicates that the
legislature knew what it was doing when it incorporated the term
into SMCRA. Between this current use and the extensive back-
ground of interpretation of the term, VER can be referred to as
having a definite meaning.
It is a common maxim of statutory interpretation that when
a term is repeatedly used in a certain way, Congress intended
that meaning to apply to each use.203 As Justice Frankfurter put
it,
[wiords of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning
of their habitat whether it be a phrase of technical significance
in the scientific or business world, or whether it be loaded with
the recondite connotations of feudalism. Holmes made short
shrift to a contention by remarking that statutes used "familiar
legal expressions in their familiar legal sense." 20 4
This rule has been voiced in numerous other cases: "we, there-
fore, must assume that Congress intended to use the terms . . .
as they have historically been understood for the past half cen-
9 Id.
o See Macleod & Means, supra note 22, at § 7.03[5].
2" See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 108.
23 See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972).
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, Sixth Annual Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo Lecture, March 18, 1947. (The Holmes quote is from Henry v. United
States, 251 U.S. 393, 395 (1920).)
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tury;"' 2 "when Congress uses words in a statute without defin-
ing them, and those words have a judicially settled meaning, it
is presumed that Congress intended them to have that meaning
in the statute; ' 206 "where Congress uses terms that have accu-
mulated settled meaning under either equity or common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Con-
gress means to incorporate the established meaning of the
term; '" 207 "when a term is used in different statutes but in the
same context and in a similar manner, the courts are to presume
that Congress intended the later use of the term to be construed
in the same way as its earlier use."
208
Aside from citing the "changed context" of VER, the Sec-
retary argued for a new definition of the term by noting that
"prior case law which developed around the concept of VER
does not apply to the Surface Mining Act because Section 522(e)
affects both Federal and non-Federal lands and minierals [sic]. "2
However, the legislative history of SMCRA indicates that Con-
gress used the term VER fully aware of the fact that it had
applied in the past only to federal law. In the House Conference
Report on the 1975 version of Section 522(e), the Committee
stated that VER "is intended, however, to make clear that the
prohibition of strip mining on the national forests is subject to
previous state court interpretation of valid existing rights.
'210
The Committee specifically cited United States v. Polino2" as an
example of how state law determines the extent of VER on non-
federal land. 2' 2 The same statement appeared in the House Com-
mittee Report for the next two legislative sessions, until the Act
was passed. 21 3 Also, the Senate Committee, referring to severed
estates, called for state law to resolve any property disputes that
' Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 404 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
"' Tafoya v. United States Dept. of Justice, 748 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1984).
Reed v. Lukhard, 591 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (W.D. Va. 1984).
Agosto v. Barcelo, 594 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (D.P.R. 1984).
44 Fed. Reg. 14,993 (1979).
110 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 189, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1985).
21 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.W.Va. 1955).
211 H.R. CONF. REP. 189, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1975).
23 H.R. REP. No. 896, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 48 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977).
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might arise therefrom. "The Committee firmly believes that all
valid existing property rights must be preserved, and has no
intention whatsoever, by any provision of this bill, to change
such rights.12 14 Despite this language, however, the Secretary
determined that the "context" of VER changed with the passage
of the Act.
2 15
The Secretary's only mention of Polino in his discussion of
the legislative history of SMCRA was to point out that, although
it related to the interpretation of private conveyances, it did not
relate to the takings question.2'6 The Secretary gleaned that
Congress' intention in inserting the VER savings clause was to
avoid a taking. This determination was based upon a remark by
Congressman Udall in floor debate, objecting to an amendment
calling for the deletion of a VER savings clause from another
section of the Senate Bill. 217 Actually, this particular amendment
did not concern Section 522(e) at all. Rather, it was directed at
Section 601, which deals with the designation of lands unsuitable
for non-coal mining. Section 601(d) states, in part, that "[v]alid
existing rights shall be preserved and not affected by such des-
ignation.121 8 Congressman Roncalio had offered an amendment
that would have stricken the VER clause from this section of
the bill. His concern was with stopping the development of a
proposed limestone quarry on the edge of the town of Story,
Wyoming. Since a claim had already been established for the
quarry, the Congressman was afraid upcoming operation would
mar the historical and aesthetic values of that "small picturesque
town. ' ' 219 In response, Congressman Udall replied: "the amend-
ment . . . takes from the bill a statement that valid legal rights
should be preserved. I do not think we should do that without
paying compensation under the fifth amendment. ' 220 From this
2,, S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977) (emphasis added); see also
Macleod & Means, supra note 22, at § 7.03[5].
215 Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
216 44 Fed. Reg. 14,991 (1979).
217 Id. Although the Secretary cites this piece of legislative history as "Congressional
Record, April 10, 1977, H-3827," the statement was actually made on April 29, 1977,
and is recorded at Congressional Record, April 29, 1977, H-12878.
SMCRA § 601(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1281(d) (1982).
9 CONG. REc. H-12878 (1977) (According to the Congressman, "[tihere is no
lovelier area in Wyoming than Story, Wyo.")
' Id. The amendment was rejected.
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single remark, the Secretary concluded that the intent of Con-
gress was for VER to be defined in terms of "those rights which
cannot be affected without paying compensation." 221
As a result of this singular interpretation of the Congres-
sional intent of the VER savings clause, the Secretary promul-
gated the all permits test in an attempt to mark that line where
rights were such that a prohibition on mining would effect a
taking.2 22 Dissatisfied, the Secretary eventually rejected the all
permits test and instituted the short-lived takings test.223 Since
that test has been remanded, the all permits test is now in
effect.224 Although there is precedent for Congressional concern
with the takings question, it does not follow that the finding of
a takings was the sine qua non for VER. 225 Indeed, such an
approach totally ignores the equitable strand that underlies many
pre-SMCRA VER cases. To cut back on VER to the point that
the only legal rights recognized are those that cannot be taken
is to ignore the fundamental goal of preserving existing rights
that permeates the case law and the legislative history.
Both the takings test and the all permits test miss the point
of VER because they focus on the extent of regulation rather
than the nature of the right itself. Polino looked to the nature
of the right. Certainly one of the major differences between
mining in the West and mining in the East is that in the East,
the minerals are generally privately owned. Since the United
States owns most of the minerals in the West, rights there are
determined by statute. In the East, however, the nature of such
rights is usually determined by contract and state property law.
Polino dealt with state interpretation of property rights under
a deed. 226 There, the owner had conveyed the surface estate to
the United States while reserving the minerals. The court ex-
amined state law to determine the nature of the rights remaining
in the mineral owner. 227 Since the nature of those rights did not
21 44 Fed. Reg. 14,992 (1979).
22 Id.
2, See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
51 Fed. Reg. 41,954 (1986).
=' See Macleod & Means, supra note 22, at § 7.03[5].
Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772.
n7 Id. at 774.
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include the right to strip mine, the court never reached the
question of mine regulation. There was no right, valid at the
time, as would allow mining to proceed. Thus, the status quo
was preserved, and existing rights were impaired. Consequently,
the prohibitions of Section 522(e) would not apply to that par-
ticular piece of property. There was no VER to which Section
522(e) would be subject.
228
It is interesting to speculate on the effect of a holding op-
posite to Polino. Since the state law prevented opening up the
forest to strip mining, 229 by negative implication the reverse
would be true if state law determined that the right to mine did
exist. 230 This would imply the existence of a valid right such as
could come under the savings clause of Section 522(e). However,
such a result could not be reached so long as a more stringent
national rule like the all permits test remains in effect. Such a
national rule makes the state law determination a moot point.
It can be questioned whether Congress intended such a turn of
events.
CONCLUSION
Outside the aberrational definition proposed by the Secretary
under SMCRA, the law of VER has been relatively straightfor-
ward. VER is a property right, and the purpose of SMCRA's
savings clauses utilizing the term has been to reserve property
rights existing at the time of passage.23 ' In the regulatory context,
an added inquiry has been tacked on to VER determinations,
setting up a two-step process. First comes the question of whether
there is a right. Then, and only then, is the question reached of
the extent to which the right may be regulated. To apply this
approach to Section 522(e) of SMCRA, it is important to begin
by examining the nature of the prohibition on mining. Unlike
the "brief hiatus" distinguished in Sierra Club v. Watt,23 2 the
228 See also United States v. Sterns, 595 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (reaching a
similar conclusion construing a Kentucky deed).
"I H.R. CONF. REP. No. 189, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 896,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 48 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977).
230 Sterns, 595 F. Supp. at 812.
"I See, e.g., Williams v. Brening, 51 I.D. 225 (1925).
232 608 F. Supp. 305, 335 (D.C. Cal. 1985) (quoting Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas
Ass'n v. Watts, 696 F.2d 734, 750 (10th Cir. 1982)).
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per se ban would not allow for any regulatory controls of strip
mining. Hence the issue of whether the ban is "subject to" VER
must be addressed in the first instance.
If VER exists, then the per se ban must be subordinated to
the right. The language of the statute allows no other construc-
tion. Only after determining that the per se ban is inapplicable
does the issue of regulatory control through performance and
reclamation standards come into play. At this point, the question
of a taking would be determined. 23 3 The issue would be deter-
mined based on whether or not a reasonable use of the police
power was being effected to control a particular use of property.
Generally speaking, it would be rare in this instance for a taking
to occur.
23 4
The Secretary has bypassed this two-step analysis by attempt-
ing to define VER initially in terms of the takings question. He
equates what is essentially a withdrawal provision with a regu-
latory control on the use of property, thereby ignoring the
threshold question of whether there is a right which may be
controlled by regulation. In doing so, he abrogates both the
expression of Congress and over a century of legal decisions
delineating the nature of VER. Given that the Secretary started
from the premise that there is no VER unless there is a taking
- a circular argument at best - it isn't surprising that ten years
after the passage of the Act, no agreement has been reached on
a definition of the term.
Monroe Jamison
"I See Solicitor's Op., 88 I.D. 909, 914 (1981).
23, Id.; see also Note, supra note 38; McGinley & Barrett, supra note 38; and
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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